Utilities Select Sector

S&P 500

The Balanced Allocator

Comparable Companies - AES

No open-market insider trades were found in the last 12 months. Short interest as of 2025-12-31 was 21,215,545 shares, representing 3.0% of the float with 3.5 days to cover. Top institutional filers include BlackRock, Inc. (5.9%), State Street Corporation (6.1%), and Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (5.0%).

The securities were acquired and are held in the ordinary course of business and were not acquired and are not held for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.

President and Chief Executive Officer

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

Executive Vice President & President, Energy Infrastructure and Leader of International Markets

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

Executive Vice President and President of US & Renewables

Chairman of the Board

Director

Andres Ricardo Gluski Weilert

Stephen Coughlin

Juan Ignacio Rubiolo

Ricardo Manuel Falu

Bernerd Da Santos

John B. Morse, Jr.

Gerard M. Anderson

Inderpal S. Bhandari

Janet G. Davidson

Holly K. Koeppel

Julie M. Laulis

Alain Monié

Moisés Naím

Teresa M. Sebastian

Maura Shaughnessy

Exelon is a transmission and distribution company delivering electricity and natural gas service to customers and communities. It operates a regulated utility platform focused on maintaining industry-leading operational excellence and ensuring timely recovery on investments.

Electric utility serving northern Illinois, including Chicago.

Electric and gas utility serving southeastern Pennsylvania.

Electric and gas utility serving central Maryland.

Electric utility serving Washington D.C., and parts of Maryland and Virginia.

Electric utility serving southern New Jersey.

Duke Energy is a diversified holding company with natural gas and electric utility operations, an equity ownership interest in ATC (a for-profit electric transmission company), and non-utility energy infrastructure operations through We Power (generation assets) and WECI (renewable generating facilities).

Regulated electric utility operations serving customers in Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota.

Regulated natural gas utility operations serving customers in Wisconsin and Michigan.

Includes generation assets (We Power), underground natural gas storage (Bluewater), and renewable generating facilities (WECI).

PPL operates four regulated utilities located in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Rhode Island. Its strategy is focused on creating the utilities of the future to drive greater value for customers and shareowners.

Regulated electric utility operations in Kentucky.

Regulated electric utility operations in Pennsylvania.

Regulated electric utility operations in Rhode Island.

Regulated natural gas utility operations in Kentucky and Pennsylvania.

WEC Energy Group is a diversified holding company with natural gas and electric utility operations serving customers in Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota, an approximately 60% equity ownership interest in ATC, and non-utility energy infrastructure operations through We Power, Bluewater, and WECI.

The company owns and/or operates a generation portfolio of approximately 31,459 megawatts. It has operations in the United States, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Europe, and Asia. The company's headquarters are located at 4300 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia.

AES is managed by a team with deep operational experience in the energy sector but demonstrates poor capital allocation skill, characterized by pro-cyclical reinvestment and value-destructive M&A. The financial narrative from P1 highlights a company in transition, with aggressive CapEx (60% of revenue) funded by debt, leading to an extremely leveraged balance sheet (Debt/Equity 821.5%) and ROIC (1.7%) well below the cost of capital. While the board is strong and independent, the management team's incentive structure lacks explicit through-cycle metrics, and the CEO's track record, though long-tenured, does not show a proven history of navigating industry cycles successfully at other companies. The team is executing on growth but at the expense of balance sheet health and shareholder returns.

No specific narrative summary of material regulations, compliance costs, or environmental legal proceedings was disclosed in the provided context.

No aggregate data on total headcount, turnover rate, or geography/gender breakdowns was disclosed.

No specific disclosures on product safety, quality management, responsible marketing, or data privacy were provided in the context.

No specific disclosures on responsible sourcing, audits, or community engagement programs were provided in the context.

Revenue declined 3.1% year-over-year in FY 2024 to $12.28 billion due to strategic asset sales, while operating margin improved to 12.0% from 8.5% in FY 2023, though heavily influenced by non-recurring asset monetizations and tax attributes.

Management's CapEx strategy is focused on high-return U.S. renewables and utility rate base investments, with 85% of 2024 CapEx directed to these segments. Key projects include the Bellefield 1 solar-plus-storage (1 GW), Pike County energy storage (200 MW), and repowering of natural gas assets at AES Indiana. The strategy emphasizes 'fewer, larger projects with higher IRRs' and a reduction in parent investment in renewables by $1.3B through 2027.

The asset base expansion is driven by new renewable and utility investments. The improvement in Tangible Book Value is primarily due to the sale of intangible assets and goodwill associated with AES Brazil, reducing the intangible asset burden. The auditor did not identify asset impairment as a Critical Audit Matter (CAM) in the 2024 filing, but historical data shows significant write-downs (e.g., FY 2023 Tangible Book was negative).

Management claims new U.S. projects are generating 12-15% IRRs. However, the consolidated ROIC remains depressed at 1.7%, well below the estimated WACC of 10.5%. This suggests that the high returns on new projects are being diluted by the massive base of legacy assets and high interest costs.

Price to Tangible Book Value

EV/EBITDA

Former Chairman and CEO of DTE Energy; extensive experience in energy operations, finance, and strategy.

Former Global Chief Data Officer of IBM; expertise in technology, AI, and cybersecurity.

Former EVP, Quality & Customer Care of Alcatel Lucent; experience in operations and customer service.

President and CEO of AES; extensive international experience in telecommunications, banking, and public sectors across South America.

Former CFO of American Electric Power; extensive experience in energy and infrastructure finance and investment.

President, CEO, and Chair of Cable One; experience in managing regulated businesses in technology and infrastructure.

Non-Executive Chairperson and former CEO of Ingram Micro; extensive experience in global operations and supply chain.

Chairman and Lead Independent Director; former SVP, Finance and CFO of The Washington Post Company; Certified Public Accountant.

Distinguished Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Minister of Industry and Trade in Venezuela; expertise in international affairs and policy.

President and CEO of The Dominion Asset Group; extensive experience in finance, law, capital markets, and enterprise risk management.

Former Global Portfolio Manager of MFS Utilities Fund; extensive experience in asset management and global utilities sector.

Ricardo Falu

All Directors and Executive Officers as a Group (17 persons)

NEOs expected to acquire and hold shares equal in value to a multiple of their annual salaries: CEO (6x), Other NEOs (3x). Non-employee Directors expected to hold equity ownership equal to at least five times the annual retainer within five years.

The AES Corporation is a global power company that owns and operates a diverse portfolio of renewable and thermal energy generation and distribution facilities. The company's business involves the development, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of power plants to supply electricity to utilities, industrial users, and other end customers.

Held WACC 10.5% and Terminal Multiple 9.0x constant, solved for Operating Margin.

Balance Sheet - Supplemental

Balance Sheet

Cash Flow Statement - Supplemental

Cash Flow Statement

Income Statement - Supplemental

Income Statement

Ratios

Valuation

Historical Ratios & Multiples - AES

The utility sector is seeing unprecedented load growth, but this is accompanied by rising financing costs and supply chain constraints. While peers like NextEra and Duke are outperforming, AES's high leverage makes it more sensitive to the 'higher-for-longer' interest rate environment.

AES is at a critical juncture as it faces a massive legal liability while simultaneously being touted as a top AI/data center play, creating a volatile window for a fundamental correction.

Resolution of the $4.0B Panama Lawsuit. A negative ruling would likely trigger a credit downgrade and invalidate the 'self-funded' thesis.

Conclusion of Strategic Review/M&A Chatter. An official announcement of a sale or the termination of talks will re-rate the stock to its fundamental value.

Balance Sheet and Solvency Risk. The company's 821.5% Debt/Equity ratio and 2.17x interest coverage leave no room for operational error.

Lower-for-longer cyclical downturn in Latin American hydrology or renewable pricing.

The current asset base of The AES Corporation primarily consists of a diversified portfolio of power generation and energy storage facilities, including coal, natural gas, hydro, wind, solar, and biomass technologies. As of year-end 2025, the estimated total operational generation capacity is approximately 32,629 MW. This figure accounts for the company's stated generation portfolio, adjusted for the sale of 5.2 GW in Brazil, the addition of 2.5 GW in Chile, the completion of a 670 MW combined cycle gas plant in Panama in Q4 2024, and the targeted 3.2 GW of renewable capacity brought online in 2025. Significant additions in 2025 include the 1 GW Bellefield 1 solar plus storage project, a 200 MW Pike County energy storage facility, and the 250 MW Petersburg Energy Center (solar + storage).

RWE acquisition of Con Edison Clean Energy Business (primarily solar assets)

American Electric Power sale of contracted, unregulated renewables business

Duke Energy Commercial Renewables sale to Brookfield Renewable

U.S. natural gas power M&A valuations for top PJM assets

Cash & Equivalents

Accounts Receivable

The inventory valuation for The AES Corporation is based on its nature as a mix of commodity fuels and fungible/specialized power plant components. The TTM inventory turnover of 16.11 indicates a healthy, fast-moving inventory, which is a positive factor for recovery rates in a liquidation scenario, as it suggests minimal obsolescence risk. The liquidation channels would involve wholesale markets for fuels and specialized industrial buyers for parts. The base case recovery rate of 65.0% is a conservative yet realistic estimate, balancing the high recoverability of commodity fuels with the potential for discounts on more specialized equipment. The high case of 80.0% reflects optimal market conditions and strong demand, while the low case of 50.0% accounts for potential market weaknesses or difficulties in liquidating specific items. This approach ensures a nuanced valuation that considers both the intrinsic characteristics of the inventory and the practicalities of an orderly liquidation.

Inventory

Tax Assets

Other Current Assets

**Primary Transaction Comps:**
- RWE acquisition of Con Edison Clean Energy Business (primarily solar assets) ($2,157/kW)
- American Electric Power sale of contracted, unregulated renewables business ($1,099/kW)
- Duke Energy Commercial Renewables sale to Brookfield Renewable ($824/kW)
- U.S. natural gas power M&A valuations for top PJM assets (Up to $1,930/kW)

**Replacement/Scrap Data:**
Recent construction cost data for new power generation facilities indicate significant variations by technology and increasing trends. Utility-scale solar farm costs for 2025 are estimated between $850/kW and $1,100/kW, while 2024 figures ranged from $800/kW to $1,360/kW. Onshore wind construction costs were around $1,451/kW in 2022. New natural gas power plant capital costs for 2025 average $2,200/kW to $3,000/kW, a substantial increase from $785/kW in 2022. Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) turnkey costs for a 1 MW / 4 MWh system in 2025 typically range from $1,200/kW to $2,500/kW, with battery pack prices expected to fall below $100/kWh by 2025.

Net PP&E

Intangibles

Long-Term Inv.

Other Non-Current

Accounts Payable

Current Debt

Tax Liabilities

Other Current Liabilities

Non-Current Debt

Other Non-Current Liabilities

AES reported Q3 2025 financial results, showing significant year-over-year growth and reaffirmed 2025 guidance and long-term targets.

FMR LLC and Abigail P. Johnson filed an amendment reporting 5.7% beneficial ownership of AES Corp common stock.

AES stockholders approved the 2025 Equity and Incentive Compensation Plan at the Annual Meeting.

AES Corporation entered into an underwriting agreement to issue $800 million of 5.800% Senior Notes due 2032.

AES announced 2024 financial results, achieved strategic goals, and initiated 2025 guidance while reaffirming long-term growth targets.

AES ACHIEVES 2024 STRATEGIC & FINANCIAL GOALS

AES reported Q3 2024 results, completed 1.2 GW of construction, and added 2.2 GW of renewables PPAs and data center load growth.

Jefferies Starts AES Corp. (AES) at Buy

The Vanguard Group filed an amendment to its ownership of AES Corp common stock, reporting 13.11% beneficial ownership.

AES expects full year 2023 Adjusted EPS to be in the top half of the guidance range of $1.65 to $1.75.

AES EXPECTS FULL YEAR 2023 ADJUSTED EPS TO BE IN THE TOP HALF OF GUIDANCE RANGE OF $1.65 TO $1.75

Recording Academy® To Honor Music Luminaries With 2023 Special Merit Awards During Grammy® Week

AES reaffirmed 2022 guidance and reported Q2 2022 results while advancing renewable projects.

AES REAFFIRMS 2022 ADJUSTED EPS GUIDANCE; REMAINS ON TRACK TO DELIVER ON RENEWABLES GROWTH

AES reaffirmed 2021 guidance and achieved key strategic milestones in renewable growth.

AES met or exceeded all 2020 strategic and financial objectives, including signing 3 GW of renewables PPAs.

AES MET OR EXCEEDED ALL 2020 STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES

AES Corp. upgraded to Buy at Argus on more sustainable earnings growth

AES Corp. price target raised to $24 from $23 at Morgan Stanley

AES Corp. price target raised to $15 from $14 at Barclays

AES Corp. price target raised to $17 from $16 at Susquehanna

AES Corp. initiated with an In Line at Evercore ISI

AES is attempting a strategic pivot toward high-demand data center power, but the business remains a Cyclical Operator burdened by a distressed capital structure and chronic value destruction. While management points to an 11.9 GW contracted backlog, the company's ROIC of 1.7% fails to cover its 10.5% cost of capital, and a massive $29.9B debt load (821.5% Debt/Equity) leaves the equity vulnerable. Despite speculative M&A interest from infrastructure funds, our fundamental synthesis suggests the stock is overvalued relative to its operational reality and weighted liquidation value.

Executive Summary

The primary driver of our bearish view is the company's inability to generate returns above its cost of capital, evidenced by a TTM ROIC of 1.7% against a 10.5% WACC. This operational drag is compounded by a $29.9B debt load that necessitates constant asset recycling, creating a fragile 'self-funding' model that is highly sensitive to interest rates and execution risk.<ul><li>Driver: Structural value destruction and extreme financial leverage.</li><li>Catalyst: Credit downgrade or failure to execute the $3.5B asset sale program.</li><li>Protection: Net Liquidation Value (NLV) of $17.00 per share.</li></ul>Our variant perception is that the market is incorrectly pricing AES as a 'Renewable Compounder' due to its data center exposure, while ignoring its reality as a distressed Cyclical Operator. While the consensus focuses on the 11.9 GW backlog, our analysis of the capital structure reveals that the company is destroying economic value on every dollar reinvested, as incremental ROIC of 2.8% remains far below the cost of debt. The market is extrapolating growth from a business model that is fundamentally broken at current leverage levels.This is a fundamental short thesis based on the disconnect between a speculative growth narrative and a distressed balance sheet, where the equity value is being squeezed by $29.9B in liabilities and persistent operational headwinds.

Core Investment Rationale

AES operates as a global power generation and utility company with a portfolio of 31,459 MW. The company is currently pivoting from a volume-based renewables strategy to a 'quality over quantity' model, focusing on the U.S. data center market. Revenue is primarily generated through long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), but the top line has stagnated, declining 3.1% YoY to $12.28B in FY 2024 as the company sells off international assets like AES Brazil to fund domestic growth.The strategy relies on a 'self-funded' model through 2027, which involves $3.5B in planned asset sales and the monetization of tax attributes. However, the business remains capital-intensive, with CapEx at 60.2% of revenue ($7.39B), far exceeding its net cash from operations of $2.75B.The core asset base consists of a diversified generation fleet including solar, wind, energy storage, and thermal (gas/coal). Key assets include the 1 GW Bellefield 1 solar-plus-storage project and the 200 MW Pike County energy storage facility. As a Cyclical Operator, the value of these assets is tied to operational leverage and the ability to secure high-IRR contracts (12-15% targeted) in a tight supply environment for data centers.AES competes in a rational but intense utility oligopoly against much larger peers like Duke Energy ($92.7B market cap) and Exelon ($45.2B market cap). AES is a structural underdog, operating with a 12.0% operating margin, which is less than half the peer median of 24.4%. This cost disadvantage makes AES a 'Commodity Price-Taker' in the wholesale power markets.Over the last full business cycle, AES has struggled with high volatility and frequent impairments, leading to a negative tangible book value as recently as FY 2023. Management has navigated this volatility by aggressively rotating the portfolio, selling legacy coal and international assets to reinvest in U.S. renewables.Currently, the situation is defined by a material governance and legal crisis. In January 2026, a $4.0B civil lawsuit was filed against AES alleging monopolistic practices in the Panamanian LNG market. Simultaneously, the company is the subject of intense M&A chatter, with reports that BlackRock and Brookfield are exploring a potential $40B enterprise value acquisition. This speculative environment has supported the stock price despite deteriorating fundamentals, including a 3.1% revenue decline and a Net Debt/EBITDA ratio of 7.5x.

Business & Situation

<ul><li>Bull Case: Data center demand provides a massive tailwind, with 9.5 GW of signed agreements and a leadership position in energy storage via the Fluence joint venture. Management's cost-saving program is on track to deliver $300M in annual run-rate savings by 2026, potentially improving margins.</li><li>Bear Case: The capital structure is unsustainable, with $29.9B in debt and an ROIC of 1.7% that destroys shareholder value. Execution risk is high as the company attempts to triple its renewables capacity by 2027 while facing a $4.0B legal liability in Panama.</li></ul>The market views AES as a prime beneficiary of the AI-driven electricity surge, focusing on its 11.9 GW backlog and partnerships with hyperscalers like Microsoft and Google. This narrative assumes that the 'powered land' strategy will unlock high-margin growth and that asset sales will successfully bridge the funding gap without equity dilution.The utility sector is seeing unprecedented load growth, but this is accompanied by rising financing costs and supply chain constraints. While peers like NextEra and Duke are outperforming, AES's high leverage makes it more sensitive to the 'higher-for-longer' interest rate environment.Our differentiated view is that the 'growth' being priced in is economically dilutive. Management's claim of being 'self-funded' is a misnomer; the company issued $15.4B in debt over the last 4.7 years to fund $26.7B in CapEx, as operating cash flow only covered 47.5% of sources. The $4.0B Panama lawsuit is not a peripheral issue but a potential 'thesis killer' that could trigger a credit downgrade, forcing a dilutive equity raise. The M&A rumors likely reflect a 'distressed sale' exploration rather than a position of strength.We conclude that the speculative upside from a potential takeover is outweighed by the fundamental risk of a capital structure collapse. At a 12.0% operating margin vs. a 24.4% peer median, AES is the weakest operator in an attractive sector.Our analytical edge is a granular deconstruction of the 'self-funding' narrative, which reveals a structural reliance on debt markets that the consensus has overlooked in favor of the data center growth story.

Core Thesis

CEO Andres Gluski has led AES for 14 years, overseeing a period of significant portfolio transformation. However, his tenure has been marked by pro-cyclical capital allocation, with Net Debt increasing 7.4% in the last year alone to $27.97B. While he has successfully signed GWs of capacity, he has failed to translate that growth into meaningful ROIC, which remains at a depressed 1.7%.Weak. Management has demonstrated poor skill, with an M&A effectiveness score of 0.1x and a reinvestment rate of 205.8% that has failed to produce returns above the cost of capital. No share buybacks have been executed despite the stock trading near historical lows.Mixed. Management consistently beats 'Adjusted' EPS targets through asset monetization but frequently misses operational EBITDA targets due to 'one-time' weather events in Colombia and Brazil, suggesting a lack of candor regarding the inherent risks of their global footprint.<ul><li>Board Independence: 90.9% (10 of 11 directors)</li><li>Chairman/CEO Roles: Separate</li><li>Chairman Tenure: 17 Years (John B. Morse, Jr.)</li><li>Insider Ownership: 0.65% (All Directors and Officers)</li><li>Shareholder Rights: Declassified Board, Majority Voting, Proxy Access</li></ul>Stewardship is characterized by strong structural governance but poor capital outcomes. Given the current M&A chatter and legal pressure, we see a Governance Outcome Tree: 1. Status Quo: Management continues the asset-sale treadmill (High Risk). 2. Strategic Sale: A takeover by BlackRock/Brookfield at a premium (Medium Probability). 3. Credit Event: The Panama lawsuit or a funding gap forces a restructuring (Low but Rising Risk).

Leadership & Governance

The valuation floor is derived from the Net Liquidation Value (NLV) of $17.00 per share, based on an orderly liquidation of the 32,629 MW generation portfolio at $1,500/kW.Base case assumes 5-7% EBITDA growth and successful execution of the $3.5B asset sale program, but ROIC remains below WACC, leading to a fair value of $12.48.Bull case assumes accelerated data center demand and a strategic sale of the company at $24.00 per share.The Bear Case Fair Value is $0.00. This distressed framework is applied because the company's ROIC (1.7%) is significantly below its WACC (10.5%), and the $29.9B debt load combined with the $4.0B Panama lawsuit creates a high probability of a credit event or massive dilution that would wipe out common equity holders.

Valuation Context

<ul><li>Resolution of the $4.0B Panama Lawsuit. A negative ruling would likely trigger a credit downgrade and invalidate the 'self-funded' thesis.</li><li>Conclusion of Strategic Review/M&A Chatter. An official announcement of a sale or the termination of talks will re-rate the stock to its fundamental value.</li></ul>AES is at a critical juncture as it faces a massive legal liability while simultaneously being touted as a top AI/data center play, creating a volatile window for a fundamental correction.

Catalyst Path & Context

<ul><li>Balance Sheet and Solvency Risk. The company's 821.5% Debt/Equity ratio and 2.17x interest coverage leave no room for operational error. Net debt increased 7.4% to $27.97B in FY 2024 despite management's deleveraging claims.</li><li>Lower-for-longer cyclical downturn in Latin American hydrology or renewable pricing. Weather events in Colombia and Brazil already drove 2024 EBITDA to the low end of guidance.</li></ul>

Primary Risks

<ul><li>Entry Target: Not applicable for a Sell recommendation.</li><li>Stop Loss: Not applicable for a Sell recommendation.</li><li>Position Size: Sizing reflects a 'None' posture as the expected return of -12.05% and the fundamental value destruction make the stock uninvestable at current levels. The final size is constrained by the extreme structural risks inherent to the Cyclical Operator model with 821.5% leverage.</li><li>Time Horizon: Not applicable for a Sell recommendation.</li></ul><ul><li>Progress on the $3.5B asset sale target</li><li>Legal developments in the $4.0B Panama lawsuit</li><li>Moody's FFO/Net Debt ratio (target 12% by 2026)</li></ul>Evidence that the $4.0B Panama lawsuit will result in a material judgment or that the company cannot execute asset sales at book value.

Actionable Parameters & Monitoring

The AES Corporation is a distressed Cyclical Operator whose equity is currently buoyed by speculative M&A rumors and a data center growth narrative that ignores fundamental value destruction. With an ROIC of 1.7% and a $29.9B debt load, the company is structurally fragile and overvalued at current levels. We recommend a Sell with a Valuation Target of 12.48.

Final Conclusion

Structural value destruction and extreme financial leverage.

Driver

Credit downgrade or failure to execute the $3.5B asset sale program.

Catalyst

Net Liquidation Value (NLV) of $17.00 per share.

Protection

Data center demand provides a massive tailwind, with 9.5 GW of signed agreements and a leadership position in energy storage via the Fluence joint venture. Management's cost-saving program is on track to deliver $300M in annual run-rate savings by 2026, potentially improving margins.

Bull Case

The capital structure is unsustainable, with $29.9B in debt and an ROIC of 1.7% that destroys shareholder value. Execution risk is high as the company attempts to triple its renewables capacity by 2027 while facing a $4.0B legal liability in Panama.

Bear Case

AES is attempting a strategic pivot toward high-demand data center power, but the business remains a Cyclical Operator burdened by a distressed capital structure and chronic value destruction. While management points to an 11.9 GW contracted backlog, the company's ROIC of 1.7% fails to cover its 10.5% cost of capital, and a massive $29.9B debt load (821.5% Debt/Equity) leaves the equity vulnerable. Despite speculative M&A interest from infrastructure funds, our fundamental synthesis suggests the stock is overvalued relative to its operational reality and weighted liquidation value.

The strategy has evolved from a growth-at-all-costs model focused on volume (record 5.6 GW signings in 2023) to a disciplined, profitability-focused approach prioritizing high-return projects and balance sheet strength. By 2025, the narrative shifted to capitalizing on the specific 'time to power' crisis in data centers, moving beyond generic renewables growth to a targeted strategy around 'powered land' DTAs and co-located storage solutions.

Method	Implied Value	Weight	Weighted Value
Comps	$5.69	40%	$2.28
NLV	$17.00	60%	$10.20
Total Weighted			$12.48

AES

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Valuation Table